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COMMENTS
THE CONTROVERSIAL LAND CODE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: A BALANCED
APPROACH TO RESOLVING RUSSIA'S LAND
REFORM QUESTION AND ENCOURAGING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Matthew J. Madalo*
A sphinx is Russia; sorrow and joy embrace
Her both; and she is darkly drenched in gore
She gazes, gazes, gazes in thy face
And in that look both love and hate implore.
- Alexander Blok
I. INTRODUCTION
The Lower House of Russian Parliament, known as the
Duma, is encountering many obstacles in its pursuit of a
comprehensive land code for the country. The reasons for the
impasse are as numerous and complicated as the political
forces that are battling behind the scenes over this controver-
sial piece of legislation. Currently, the Russian Federation
continues to operate with a patchwork of decrees, legislation
and an outdated land code that was enacted in 1991 when the
Soviet Union was still in existence.' That code contradicts the
* Book Review/Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D.
candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., California State Univer-
sity, Sacramento; IE Professional Development Fellow for Central and Eastern
Europe, 2000-2001.
1. See generally GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 178-184 (1996) (providing a general discussion of land reform legisla-
tion and presidential decrees that have been enacted to regulate land owner-
ship); Yevgenia Borisova, No Land Rush Without Land Code, THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times
File.
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Russian Constitution by not providing for private land owner-
ship.2 A new draft Land Code has been in committee since
1996 and is now the subject of heated debate in the Duma.
This new draft, proposed by the Agrarians and Communists,
requires an individual to lease and work a parcel of land as a
farmer for ten years before he may take ownership of the
land.' Land owners must also pass an agricultural qualifying
exam before they are allowed to own a parcel of land that can
be worked by an individual.4 The Union of Right Forces party
has proposed an alternative Code which puts one condition on
land sales; agricultural land must be used for agricultural
purposes.5
The importance of resolving this dispute cannot be un-
derestimated. Russia's land will have an eventual market
value estimated at approximately five trillion dollars.6 It is
therefore of vital interest to foreign investors to have a stable
environment to protect their investment. Property rights are
a key determinant of economic activity and consequently es-
tablish the rate and pattern of economic development.!
Therefore, the contents of the new code will not only have an
important effect on Russia itself, but also on foreign inves-
tors, many of whom already have a large stake in the rebirth
of an economically strong Russia. While this is not the first
time that such a controversial and comprehensive land re-
2. Article 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation provides: "Land
and other natural resources may become private, state, municipal, and other
forms of property." KONST. RF [Constitution] art. 9 (Russ.). Article 36 provides:
"(1) The right of private ownership shall be protected by law. (2) Each person
shall have the right to own property and to possess, use and dispose of it both
individually and jointly with other persons." Id. art. 36. See also SMITH, supra
note 1, at 241 (providing the English text version of the Constitution of the Rus-
sian Federation).
3. Yevgenia Borisova, No Land Rush Without Land Code, THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times
File. See discussion infra at notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
4. See Borisova, supra note 3, at 1.
5. See id.
6. See Sergei Blagov, Russia: Privatizing Farmland Raises Thorny Issues,
INTER PRESS SERV., Jan. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4912452; Roy Proster-
man, Looming Land Code, THE Moscow TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times File (citing World Bank calculations re-
ported by THE NEW YORK TIMES in 1996).
7. See generally William G. Wagner, Legislative Reform of Inheritance in
Russia 1861-1914, in RuSsIAN LAW: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
143-178 (William E. Butler ed., 1977).
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form effort has been introduced in Russia,8 it symbolizes a fi-
nal break with the Soviet past that many want to bury in the
annals of history.
One of the most controversial issues in the fight for a new
land code is whether to proceed with the privatization and
development of the 128.5 million hectares of agricultural land
in the Russian Federation.9 Two regions within the Russian
Federation have already forged ahead with their own munici-
pal legislation concerning private land sales.1" The goal of
this legislation, however, has not been met; land sales have
not increased." The reason for this failure is that these laws,
enacted at the regional and municipal level, cannot operate in
a "federal legislative vacuum."'" Though the Russian Consti-
tution provides that land can be privately owned, the neces-
sary legislative framework to implement and regulate land
ownership is non-existent.
4
Those opposed to the land code proposed by the Commu-
nists and other parties on the left argue that, without the re-
moval of restrictions on the sale of this agricultural land,
Russia will slide into further economic chaos. 5 In addition,
some argue that a land code allowing for private ownership of
agricultural lands will enable those lands to be sold to devel-
opers or mortgaged in order to allow farmers to buy the nec-
essary farm equipment and seeds to till it. 6 This argument
appears convincing especially given the fact that subsidies
are unlikely to be forthcoming from the Russian govern-
ment. 7 Meanwhile, agricultural land across the nation is
sinking into neglect with each passing year with about eighty
percent of the nation's 24,000 state or collective farms and
270,000 private farms believed to be insolvent. 8
8. See id.
9. See Borisova, supra note 3.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See KONST. RF art. 36 (Russ.).
14. See Borisova, supra note 3.
15. See generally Prosterman, supra note 6, at 1.
16. See Borisova, supra note 3.
17. See id. The RSFSR Law on Land Reform, enacted in 1990, ended gov-
ernment subsidies for collective and state-owned farms. See infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
18. See Borisova, supra note 3. The grain harvest in 1992 was 106.9 million
tons, while currently it hovers in the 50 million to 60 million ton range. See id.
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On the other hand, those supporting the land code pro-
posed by the Communists and Agrarians argue that only
those in the highest income brackets in Russia will be able to
purchase this land, namely the oligarchs, mafia, and foreign
investors. " Furthermore, the Communists and Agrarians
fear that these individuals may decide not to use the land for
agricultural purposes." Other interested parties worry that if
Russia permits the sale of agricultural land peasants will sell
these land parcels for a pittance, leaving them impover-
ished.2' The lessons learned from privatization of industry,
where the best factories were bought out by the mafia and
Russia's "new rich," demonstrate that these fears are not just
mere paranoia.
This comment analyzes the issue of Russian land reform
in three parts. Part II discusses the historical aspects of own-
ership of agricultural land and State property in Russia, Rus-
sia's policies of collectivization, and Russia's existing land
legislation and land reforms. Part III identifies the problems
associated with privatization of ownership of agricultural
land. Part IV and Part V demonstrate that the historical and
deeply rooted notions of communal and collective land owner-
ship necessitate a slower pace of privatization and recon-
struction of state farming in the Russian Federation.
II. BACKGROUND
The development of Russian law in regard to the owner-
ship of agricultural land has been of particular interest to
those who have examined its continuity and change." This
history of continuity and change becomes even more profound
when examined in the light of the proclamations of the Bol-
sheviks; that the revolution of 1917 marked a total break
with the past. 3 The Russian paradox becomes more vivid be-
19. See id. (citing an interview with Pyotr Teikhrib, who runs the Komso-
molskoye state farm in the Orenburg region of the Ural Mountains).
20. See Andrei A. Baev, The Privatization of Land in Russia: Reforms and
Impediments, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 24 (1994) (arguing that most
foreign investors are interested in Russian land for non-agricultural purposes).
See also Borisova, supra note 3.
21. See Borisova, supra note 3.
22. See Rene Beermann, Prerevolutionary Russian Peasant Laws, in
RUSSIAN LAW: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 179 (William E. But-
ler ed., 1977).
23. See id.
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cause of the fact that such an extreme approach was followed
by the adoption of laws under the New Economic Policy
("NEP").24  These laws were patterned after those of the
Tsarist period and continued under subsequent reforms and
collectivization during the Stalin period. 25 The reforms of the
Soviet period did not introduce a radical new concept of State
ownership to the Russian countryside, but rather recon-
structed old, established legal customs of the Russian peas-
ants.26
The Russian concept of land ownership is quite different
from the Western concept.2" Westerners view land ownership
as an unrestricted right to use, sell, transfer, mortgage, be-
queath, and dispose of land however the owner sees fit.28
There is no intrinsic link between land and agriculture.
However, land ownership to a Russian means owning a farm
and using the land solely for agricultural purposes.29 Early
land ownership laws in Russia reflect the relationship be-
tween land and farming. ° Therefore, any analysis of land
ownership is naturally dependent upon a knowledge of the
history of agricultural reform and privatization in Russia."
A. Land Reform in Tsarist Russia 1649-1917
Russian agriculture has a deep-rooted history in collec-
tivization and communal farming.32 The basic principles of
Russian peasant customary laws were based on the labor
principle of justice as opposed to the principles of property
24. The New Economic Policy (NEP), lasting from 1921 to 1928, was a series
of decrees issued by the Bolshevik government shortly after the end of the Civil
War, whereby private enterprise and a free-market economy were allowed to
operate on a small-scale. See NEP: Capitalism for a Day, THE Moscow TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times File.
25. See Beermann, supra note 22, at 179.
26. See id.
27. See Olga Floroff & Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Land Ownership in the Rus-
sian Federation: Laws and Obstacles, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 236 (1993) (ex-
plaining that the semantic field of the word "land" for a Russian is indelibly
linked to the semantic field of agriculture and farming).
28. See id. at 237.
29. See id. at 236.
30. See id. at 237.
31. See id.
32. See generally Beermann, supra note 22, at 179-92 (providing a historical
discussion of pre-Revolutionary reforms and laws governing the Russian rural
population up until 1917).
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relationships found in Western legal systems.33 An individual
acquired material possessions by laboring in the village com-
mune. 4 Furthermore, the Russian peasants did not privately
own land. Instead, they believed that the land was given by
God to men and should be possessed communally by all those
who till it.
35
Prior to the First World War, Russia was first among all
nations in the quantity of production and export of wheat,
and second only to the United States in the total production
of cereals.36 Despite this success, the tradition of private land
ownership was not well established in Tsarist Russia. 37 Land
was predominantly owned by peasant communal farms called
obschina or mirs.3 ' The remainder of land was owned by the
State.39  These factors hindered the development of private
land ownership.
State ownership of land was not a theoretical product of
communist ideology and collectivization. Tsarist Russia was
primarily an agricultural country with an established history
of State ownership of land. ° State property in Russia was de-
rived from the property of princes, tsars and sovereigns.41
Land that did not belong to anybody in particular was consid-
ered the property of the Tsar and placed under the jurisdic-
33. See id. at 179. It is argued by some scholars, that this was due to the re-
ception in the West of Roman law principles, which neglected labor and me-
ticulously elaborated property relationships. See id. at 180.
34. See id. at 180.
35. Although a desire for more land was an inherent characteristic of the
Russian peasant, it was not a desire for more property, per se, but a need for
more arable land to till. See id. (explaining the differences between the devel-
opment in the concepts of ownership in the West and Russia).
36. See SCOTT NEARING & JACK HARDY, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF
THE SOVIET UNION 47 (Jerome Davis ed., 1927).
37. See Baev, supra note 20, at 4.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See NEARING & HARDY, supra note 36.
41. See Baev, supra note 20, at 5 (citing the Edict on the Imperial Family of
1797 establishing a special type of property, the appanage estates or udelnii
imenija. These appanage estates were recognized as the private property of the
Imperial Family and other members of the Imperial aristocracy, and were thus
separated from the fund of the state.). See also Rafail Nasirov, Opredelenie go-
sudarstvennoi sobstvennosti v Rossiiskom dorevoluzionnom zakonodatelstve
[Definition of State Property in Pre-Revolutionary Russian Legislation], in
AKTUALNII PROBLEMI PRAVOVEDENIJA NA SOVREMENNOM ETAPE [ACTUAL
PROBLEMS WITH AUTHORITY OF THE LAW AT THE PRESENT STAGE] 12 (Sverd-
lovsk Law Inst. ed., 1992).
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tion of the state treasury.42 As the Russian empire expanded
and acquired new lands, the State took ownership of this
property.43 The ruling elite in Tsarist Russia believed that
the Russian people had put their faith in the Tsar and his
discretion to use the land to benefit the State and its people."
The Slavophiles, who included many Russian artists and
writers advancing the unique "slavic" way of developing Rus-
sia, later expounded upon these ideas concerning the forma-
tion and development of the Russian State.4" The historical
and legal development of Russia has always been slower than
the West.46 This reality reinforces a prevailing belief among
most Russians that there should be Russian solutions to Rus-
sian problems.47 Thus, as Russian history demonstrates, Rus-
sian land reform must develop at its own pace and proceed
with caution. To suggest otherwise, as some legal scholars in
the West argue,48 would be to proceed without heed to the
dangers and experiences of the unique development of Russia.
Tsarist Russia, however, faced many problems trying to
manage the huge expanse of state owned lands. At the start
of the nineteenth century, the country began embarking on
42. See Baev, supra note 20, at 5.
43. See id.
44. See id. (citing the Tsar's Minister of Finance, Count Witte, in his 1893
report to Tsar Nicholas II on land reforms):
[11n our fatherland, because of the specific historical conditions which
the Russian state has formatted and developed, a market economy
cannot restrict itself within strictly defined boundaries, which are pre-
established according to the state's needs in the generally accepted
meaning of the word. The Russian people have a deep notion, rooted in
their feelings and their minds, that everything, including a concern
about the well-being and needs of the people, springs from the power of
the Tsar.
Id. at 6
45. See generally NICOLAI BERDYAEV, THE RUSSIAN IDEA (Beacon Press ed.
1962) (explaining the foundational and philosophical beliefs of the Slavophiles).
See also Baev, supra note 20, at 6.
46. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 1-12; W. E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 14-31
(1999) (explaining the Mongol subjugation of Russia from 1240-1480, as being
the principle reason for Russia's failure to keep up with the pace and course of
legal development in Western Europe).
47. See BERDYAEV, supra note 45.
48. See Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property
in Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 131, 138-39 (1993) (arguing that although the author is a staunch sup-
porter of privatization, one must consider the fact that the answer to how to
proceed with privatization in Russia may not be as simple as it is pictured by
some American and Western researchers and analysts).
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numerous reforms to create appropriate conditions for the de-
velopment of small private farms.49 Although the slow pace of
this reform was an obstacle to faster economic development, it
nonetheless had a significant positive impact in Russia."
Tsar Alexander I's Land Reform Act of 1861 was fa-
mous for its liberation of the serfs, its elimination of landlord
property rights, and its establishment of the peasant or vil-
lage communes.5 The aim of these reforms was to create a
commercial framework, which in turn would lead to Russia's
increased economic productivity." Despite these reforms,
many peasants remained without their own land.58 The peas-
ant communes continued to own the land, and individual
peasants were not allowed to demand their share of the land
upon leaving the commune.54 Additionally, these household
plots contained only a small amount of arable land.55 Within
the commune, a peasant would farm a parcel of land only
temporarily and each time in a different place.56 This system
did not promote efficient farming and it offered the peasants
no incentive to invest their labor and capital in the land.
Meanwhile, privatization moved at a steady pace in
Tsarist Russia until the First Russian Revolution of 1905
forced the government to take serious steps to extend the
availability of private agricultural lands.58 Although the
State owned the majority of land in Russia, the actual per-
centage of state controlled land at that time is still un-
known.59 Soon after the 1905 revolution, Prime Minister
49. The Edict of 1801 initiated the process of privatizing state lands by giv-
ing merchants, the petty bourgeois, and the free peasants the right to purchase
state lands. See Baev, supra note 20, at 7.
50. See id.
51. See Beermann, supra note 22, at 182.
52. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 143.
53. See Baev, supra note 20, at 7. The Tsarist government, pursuing its
own policy interests, did not want to do away with the peasant communes. See
id.
54. See id.
55. See Beermann, supra note 22, at 185.
56. See Baev, supra note 20, at 7.
57. See id.
58. During this time, the Tsar's Minister of Finance, an advocate of private
ownership and an opponent of state economic planning established a policy of
allowing minimum state intervention in the economic sphere. State-built rail-
roads were transferred to private associations and privatization also extended
to state-owned factories, plants, and fiscal lands. See id.
59. According to the general census of 1905, the state owned thirty-eight
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Pyotr Stolypin instituted land reforms which signaled the
transition to the concept of private farming." At the time,
Stolypin's reforms represented the most significant attempt
to resolve the "land question" in Russia by promoting the de-
velopment of individual agricultural farms.6 ' Only arable
land was sold in accordance with the new reforms." Lands
belonging to churches, schools, state factories, and other or-
ganizations were excluded.63 The agricultural land was sold
to individual farmers, cooperatives, and peasant communes."
It was possible to buy land on credit with only a small down
payment, and the balance paid in annual installments for a
period ranging between 13 to 55.5 years.65 However, one con-
dition that attached to the purchase of state land was that
the buyer had to lease the land for a specified period before
being transferred title to the land.66  Additionally, the pro-
spective owner was required to move onto the property before
the State prepared and notarized the land certificates.
Specially created commissions slowly and carefully ad-
ministered this process of privatization under Stolypin's re-
forms.68 The country viewed these reforms as a success even
though the distribution of state lands did not occur on a mas-
sive scale.69
B. Collectivization and Subsequent Reform in the Soviet
Union
1. Lenin's First Attempts at Land Reform
Low level forms of collectivization began to appear soon
percent of all agricultural lands and sixty percent of all forests in the European
section of Russia. See id. at 6.
60. See id. at 8.
61. See id. (discussing the Edict of the 27th of August, 1906).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. The specially created commissions included a local administration,
judges, government, agents, and public delegates as well as representatives of
the Peasants' Land Bank to provide mortgages and assessments on the price of
distributed land. See id.
69. By January 1, 1912, only 9,351 land purchases were completed, privat-
izing approximately 421,200 acres of state-owned land. See id.
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after the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917.70 This
was done because the Bolsheviks expected a world-wide
revolution to occur that would overthrow the old capitalist or-
der. By the end of 1922, one-fourth of Russia's peasant
population was working on some form of collective farm.1
The new Bolshevik government soon found itself having to
contend with the problems of the old Tsarist Empire and its
need for land reform.7' Landlord property rights were quickly
abolished and the Bolsheviks nationalized lands previously
belonging to the Imperial Family, the government, and local
municipalities. 73  "War Communism" instituted during the
Civil War aggravated an already deteriorating situation in
the countryside, and overall agricultural production fell.4
In response to these conditions, the Bolsheviks intro-
duced NEP in 1922, whereby peasants were given a tenancy
right in the land for as long as they cultivated it. 75 NEP re-
placed forced grain requisitions with a tax in grain.7 ' All
grain produced in excess of this tax could be sold on the free
market, thus creating incentives for producing a surplus.77
The effect of NEP was tremendous: the economy recovered
and agricultural production was restored to pre-war levels.'
But the positive effects of NEP were short-lived. Soon after
Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin embarked on a program of mass
collectivization of agricultural land reversing all the progress
made under NEP.9 By 1933, there were 200,000 collective
70. See W. E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 25 (2d ed. 1988); A. K. R. Kiralfy, The
History of Soviet Collective Farm Legislation, in RUSSIAN LAW: HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 193-214 (William E. Butler ed., 1977).
71. See Kiralfy, supra note 70, at 194.
72. See BUTLER, supra note 70, at 25.
73. "'The Decree On Land' provided that peasants were the true owners of
the land in their possession.... ." See Baev, supra note 20, at 9.
74. See id., at 10. In 1918, Lenin introduced a policy known as "war com-
munism" in response to the grain crisis enveloping Russia at the time. The pri-
vate grain trade was abolished and grain was commandeered by the State in
order to fight inflation and mass starvation. See id.
75. See generally John N. Hazard, Soviet Law: The Bridge Years 1917-1920,
in RUSSIAN LAW: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 235-57 (William E.
Butler ed., 1977).
76. See id. In the exchange of goods, the State assumed more of a regula-
tory than a proprietary role, although in some fields it intended to compete with
the private sector. See BUTLER, supra note 46, at 333.
77. See id.
78. See Baev, supra note 20, at 10.
79. See Kiralfy, supra note 70.
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farms and over 14 million peasant households working in
collectives. ° Along with the catastrophic human tragedy,
collectivization resulted in the aggravation of agricultural
production problems."
2. The Effect of Stalin's Collectivization
Some commentators have argued that the main goal of
collectivization was to increase grain supplies in order to feed
workers in the cities.82 Others argue that the purpose behind
collectivization was primarily political because there were no
clear economic goals to be served by reforming the agricul-
tural organization. 3 Many scholars have proposed reasons
for the low agricultural output and food shortages during the
period of Stalinist collectivization. These include urbaniza-
tion, poor climatic conditions, and economic depression re-
sulting from war. 4
Perhaps another reason for the low agricultural output of
the collectives was the devotion of the peasant households to
their own personal plots rather than the collective farms.85
The compromise reached in the Soviet period between the
collective system and the importance of the peasant house-
hold plot has always been one of reluctant tolerance.88
The "Decree on Land" of 26 October 1917 allowed each
peasant household to retain a small personal plot.87 Even
during the years of mass collectivization, small plots were
permitted under the existing decrees and laws governing col-
lective farms.88 Despite the laws reducing their size, personal
plots appeared to have a positive effect on the economy during
this period.89 In essence, this system of small peasant house-
80. By comparison, in 1928 there were only 60,000 collective farms and less
than half a million peasant households in collectives. See id. at 194.
81. See Baev, supra note 20, at 11.
82. See Alexander Belozertsev & Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Exchanges
and the Privatization of the Agricultural Sector in the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States: Needed Steps in Creating a Market Economy, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 130 (1992).
83. See Baev, supra note 20, at 12.
84. See id.
85. See Kiralfy, supra note 70, at 212.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. A report in The Times in 1976, stated that over a quarter of Soviet farm
produce was grown on these plots, although half of this was consumed by the
2002]
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hold plots in combination with the larger arable tracks for the
collective was resonate of the obschina or village communes of
the nineteenth century.0
C. Land Reform under Perestroika
Collectivization was a failure and further attempts to
improve the system after Stalin's death did not improve agri-
cultural production.9' In the 1980's, the Soviet government
introduced incentives to the agricultural sector in order to in-
crease productivity.92 Many of these changes mirrored reforms
made under NEP.93 As the implementation of perestroika94
began to take effect it was clear that the privatization of land
was occurring at a much slower pace than expected due in
part to resistance by state farms.99 Another significant factor
was the deeply held cultural aversion to private ownership of
huge expanses of land.99 As a result, no significant change in
agricultural production was ever realized. The primary flaw
of these restructuring efforts was that they did not change
the basic premise of the centralized economy and agricultural
production: state ownership of the land.97
1. USSR Fundamentals of Law on Land Ownership
In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR")
peasant households who produced them. See Kiralfy, supra note 70, at 213.
90. See discussion supra Part II.A.
91. From the 1970's up until its demise, the Soviet Union was importing
about fifteen percent of its annual grain needs. See Baev, supra note 20, at 13.
See also Elisabeth Rubinfien, Russia Moves to Dismantle Collective Farming
System, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1993, at A16, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Major Newspapers file, Wall Street Journal (discussing the goals of collectiviza-
tion).
92. In the 1980's, Soviet economists seriously considered introducing free
market elements, similar to those used under NEP, into the national economy.
Mikhail Gorbachev advocated a brigade system of workers for collective farms,
with payment based on results. Gorbachev also proposed land- leasing ar-
rangements in the agricultural sector and the imposition of a food tax derived
from a similar tax used during the NEP period. See Baev, supra note 20, at 14.
93. See id.
94. Gorbachev's policy of reforming and reconstructing the Soviet economy
through the introduction of numerous reforms, which began shortly after his
ascension to the chair of the Communist Party and Politburo of the Soviet Un-
ion.
95. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 179.
96. See id.
97. See Baev, supra note 20, at 14.
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enacted laws establishing principles of land ownership.98 The
USSR Fundamentals of Law on Land Ownership granted a
limited right to individuals to use, possess, lease, and dispose
of land. 9 However, the right to own land, as that concept is
understood in the common-law system, which includes a deed
of title and the free use and disposition of land with unlimited
transfer rights, was not set forth in the Law on Land Owner-
ship."' Although the law on Land Ownership established the
right to possess land, it did not mention "ownership" and ex-
plicitly prohibited the buying and selling of land.' The
meaning of ownership was further confused by the adoption
of other laws expressly contradicting the provisions of the
Law on Land Ownership.
10 2
2. RSFSR Law on Land Reform
The Russian Soviet Republic government enacted the
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic ("RSFSR") Law on
Land Reform in 1990 to end subsidies to the collective farms
by transferring ownership to the farmers themselves. 13 The
RSFSR Law on Land Reform was controversial in that own-
ership of any shares of land given to farmers who wished to
leave the collective were still subject to the approval of the
rest of the farm workers.' The RSFSR Law on Land Reform
contained a number of reservations including restrictions on
the size of land that could be transferred to private owner-
ship.' 5 In addition, the State was the only entity that could
buy land from an owner.0 6 Furthermore, parcels of land could
98. See SMITH, supra note 1.
99. Osnovi Zakonodatelstva Soiuza SSR i soiuznikh respublik o zemle [Fun-
damental Legislation of the USSR and Repubics of Law on Land Ownership],
Vedomosti SSSR (Mar. 6, 1990) [hereinafter Law on Land Ownership], re-
printed in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 269-81 (W.E. But-
ler ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1991).
100. See Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 237.
101. This lack of ownership principle remained consistant to that of the
Tsarist period. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
102. One such example, is the RSFSR Law on Land Reform as discussed be-
low. See Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 238.
103. Zakon o Zemelinoj Reforme [Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
Law on Land Reform] [hereinafter RSFSR Law on Land Reform], published in
New Laws of Russia 6 (1991). See also SMITH, supra note 1 (explaining the
purpose behind enactment of the RSFSR Law on Land Reform).
104. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 180.
105. See RSFSR Law on Land Reform, supra note 103, art. 2, para. 4.
106. See id., art. 4, para. 1.
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be used only for the agricultural purposes."'
Although the RSFSR Law on Land Reform was modified
soon after its enactment, it represented a significant step to-
ward the end of the state's monopoly on land ownership. °8
The RSFSR Law on Peasant Holding 9 enacted at the same
time as the RSFSR Law on Land Reform allowed for the crea-
tion of various forms of individually and collectively-owned
farms." ° According to its provisions, agricultural land could
be owned and in certain circumstances even mortgaged."'
The RSFSR Land Code,"2 significantly changed by various
decrees by former President Yeltsin, still remains in force.1
3
When first enacted the RSFSR Land Code did not allow land
ownership for entrepreneurial purposes.1 Restrictions on
the sale of land limited it to one buyer which was the State."0
Moreover, land had to be used for a specific purpose and could
not be sold for a period of ten years from the date of grant."6
After the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
the Russian Federation, certain laws were changed to allow
for small scale land transactions. However, the core issue of
what to do with the large tracts of agricultural land in the
collective farms is still unresolved.
D. Land Reform and Privatization in the Russian Federation
The slow pace of privatization and the negative effect
that the limitations were having on land sales and the devel-
opment of a market economy influenced President Boris Yelt-
sin to issue the Decree On Urgent Matters in the Implemen-
tation of Land Reform in the RSFSR."7 This decree repealed
107. See id.
108. See Floroff& Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 241.
109. Zakon RSFSR o Krestianskom fermerskom khoziajstve [Russian Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic Law on Peasant Holding] [hereinafter RSFSR Law
on Peasant Holding], published in NEW LAWS OF RUSSIA 12 (1991).
110. See Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 242.
111. See id. at 243 (providing a detailed analysis of RSFSR Law on Peasant
Holding's provisions concerning types of ownership, as well as provisions con-
cerning mortgaging and land sales).
112. Zemelelniy Kodeks RSFSR [The Land Code of the RSFSR] (enacted
April 1991) [hereinafter RSFSR Land Code].
113. See BORISOVA, supra note 3.
114. See Floroff& Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 250.
115. See id.
116. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 180.
117. See id.
590 [Vol. 42
RUSSIAN LAND CODE REFORM
various sections of the RSFSR Land Code and required the
commercialization of all farms by March, 1992.118 After in-
tense pressure from the agricultural sector, the collective and
state farms were permitted to keep their existing legal status,
with the exception that they, and not the state, owned the
land."9 While the privatization of industry forged ahead, sev-
eral additional decrees were enacted in the interim dealing
with the purchase and sale of private land plots. 2° Efforts
began in 1993 to draft a new land code but presidential ve-
toes, a rebellious parliament, and subsequent elections
brought these efforts to an end.'2' Strong differences regard-
ing the disposition of agricultural land made it clear that
passing a new land code would be next to impossible.'22 While
the new Constitution of 1993 and the new Civil Code of 1994
emphasized the right to private land ownership, the Civil
Code like its Soviet predecessor, still tied ownership rights in
land to the purposeful uses made of it. 2' By the end of 1993,
approximately 95 percent of collective and state farms were
reorganized;'24 however the historical concept of land owner-
ship in Russia remained firmly entrenched and inseparable
from the concepts of farming and agriculture.'25
Yeltsin's reforms had little effect on the operation of col-
lective farms. Although private garden plots and family farms
did account for 40 percent of the total agriculture production,
many farmers decided not to leave the collective farms.'26
Several reasons have been advanced to explain the apparent
reluctance of many farmers to accept private ownership of
118. The decree originally provided five methods by which collective and
state farms could reorganize themselves: (1) liquidation and distribution, (2)
sale to an industrial enterprise, (3) formation of an association with the farmers
as members, (4) conversion into a joint-stock company, or (5) division of assets
and voluntary formation of a cooperative. See id.
119. See id.
120. An example is the Decree No. 503 issued in May 1993, which provided
for the regulation of the private purchase and sale of land plots. See SMITH, su-
pra note 1, at 181. See also On Regulation of Land Relations and Development
of Agrarian Reform in Russia, President's Decree No. 1767 (Oct. 27, 1993),
translated in XLV CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, No. 43, Nov.
24, 1993, at 14, available in LEXIS, All News Group File.
121. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 181.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 182.
125. See Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 269.
126. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 182.
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land.'27 The first is that farmers would have to leave the
guaranteed salary a collective farm provides.1 28 They would
also have to contend with unreliable equipment and supplies,
and assume the risks associated with farming and selling
goods in the open market.129 Another negative factor is the
agrarian sector's animosity towards Yeltsin's reforms.'
Farmers wishing to leave the collectives (as they are entitled
to do under existing decrees), must often settle for land of
marginal quality or their share of the collective is grossly un-
dervalued.' In addition, farmers are not allowed to sell or
mortgage either their land share rights or existing land
plots.'32 Against such a historical backdrop of reforms, coun-
ter-measures and resistance, the intensity of the Russian
land reform debate becomes apparent.
E. The Debate Over a New Land Code
Opponents of the draft Land Code put forth by the Com-
munists contend that the Communists' goal, "to preserve the
collective farms, whatever the cost to Russia may be," is in-
sidious.'33 Opponents also contend that the proposed code
makes it virtually impossible for an individual farmer to
leave the collective with his share of the land to start a pri-
vate farm.' Some Western legal scholars argue that such re-
straints "make property unmarketable, discourage improve-
ments on land, [and] prevent the owner's creditors from
reaching the property .... ")"' Opponents argue that prohib-
iting an owner from freely selling property and reaping the
proceeds of sale perpetuates the concentration of wealth
127. Many farmers simply do not see the risks inherent in leaving a collective
as worth the effort to farm privately. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. The Decree on Regulation of Land Relations and Development of
Agrarian Reform in Russia, supra note 120, made it possible for members of
collective farms to demand the partition of the land or receive compensation for
their share. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 180. See also supra text accompanying
note 109.
132. See RSFSR Law on Peasant Holding, supra note 109; Prosterman, supra
note 6.
133. Prosterman, supra note 6.
134. Provisions in the Communists' draft Land Code do not allow a farmer to
leave with his share of land unless he has the collective management's permis-
sion. See id.
135. Baev, supra note 20, at 19.
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among the elite.136 The central thesis of this argument is that
"private sector organizations, where rights to profits are
clearly defined, will perform better than public sector organi-
zations, where rights are diffused and uncertain."'37
On the other hand, Communists and Agrarians argue
that if the unregulated sale of agricultural land is permitted
these lands might fall prey to speculators interested in buying
the land and keeping it fallow while waiting for prices to es-
calate before they resell the land.' Land could be bought
cheaply by foreigners who without legal restraints might use
it for non-agricultural purposes.
Ever-increasing inflation and the catastrophic deprecia-
tion of the ruble have created a host of problems that further
exacerbate the already rampant corruption in Russia. 4 ' For
example, the "new rich" and Russian Mafia could take advan-
tage of unsuspecting rural landowners by purchasing their
property at unreasonably low prices leaving them with no
means of support.' Furthermore, these purchases could
serve as a means to launder money.' It is difficult to dismiss
these arguments because the lessons learned from privatiza-
tion are a vivid reminder of the power of the Mafia and other
corrupt forces destroying the country.
43
Many conclusions on the effects of land reform in Russia
can be drawn from its historical development. State owner-
ship of land has historically dominated in Russia. Further-
more, the traditional concept of land ownership in Russia
never allowed private farming to fully develop.4 Despite
these obstacles, the process of privatization has begun and
must continue in order to achieve economic stability.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Farming is a crucial part of the Russian economy, mak-
ing the debate over agricultural land reform vital to the eco-
136. See id.
137. Baev, supra note 48, at 139.
138. See Baev, supra note 20, at 19.
139. See BORISOVA, supra note 3.
140. See Baev, supra note 20, at 26.
141. See BORISOVA, supra note 3.
142. See Baev, supra note 20, at 26.
143. See Baev, supra note 48, at 142-44 (citing several examples of the fail-
ures of privatization in Russia).
144. See supra Part II.A.
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nomic recovery and stability of the Russian Federation.4 '
Choosing the appropriate course of action for land reform re-
mains a delicate issue. The question is whether Russia is
ready to radically transform its land code by adopting foreign
concepts of property ownership. The transformation from
collective to individual farming has emphasized individuali-
zation as the major direction of the land reform.46 In other
former Soviet republics, the quiet successes and failures of
agrarian reform have taken shape; however the provisions
written into their land codes still recognize the historical
Slavic land ownership principles tying rights to the land with
the uses made of it.' 47 It is useful to analyze the agrarian re-
form in these former Soviet republics in order to gauge the
likelihood of Russian success. In addition, it is also important
to analyze the historical and legal traditions of Russian land
reform in order to arrive at a possible solution to this compli-
cated problem.
IV. ANALYSIS
Commentators have argued that the Russian economy
was prematurely, and perhaps recklessly, pushed into the
process of privatization.'48 Serious economic, social, and po-
litical problems have hindered the adoption of a comprehen-
sive and speedy privatization program in Russia.'49 At the
heart of the debate are the assurances by those opposed to the
Communist draft code that land speculation and devouring of
farmland by the "new rich" for non-agrarian purposes will not
occur. 150 However, both sides agree that land reform and
some degree of privatization must take place in order to
145. See Floroff & Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 260.
146. See id.
147. See Land Code of the Ukraine, available in LEXIS, Martindale-Hubbell
International Law Digest File, Ukraine Law Digest (providing various restric-
tions and uses for land that is privatized for individual ownership). See also
Yevgeniya Borisova, Agriculture Reforms Slow to Take Root, THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times
File (discussing the fact that the former Soviet republics of Moldova and the
Ukraine have progressed much farther than the Russian Federation in the area
of land reform).
148. See Baev, supra note 20, at 1 (arguing that privatization is not by itself
a viable solution to developing a market economy in Russia because it may con-
flict with the need to improve agriculture).
149. See id.
150. See Borisova, supra note 3.
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achieve economic efficiency and prosperity."' The historical
and legal traditions of Russia demonstrate that the privatiza-
tion of land must proceed slowly and in conjunction with
other fundamental changes in order to achieve meaningful
and lasting land reform.
The key obstacle to the development of a market economy
in Russia is the historical view of the concept of land owner-
ship."' As noted above, Russian land ownership differs sig-
nificantly from its Western counterpart. Land ownership
laws in both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union reflected
the relationship between land and its particular uses."'
Many established traditions are reflected in the legislation
and affect the evolution of the political and economic con-
sciousness of the country.
5 4
Legal commentators taking a restraint approach to agri-
cultural land reform argue that the theoretical reasons for
privatization fail to consider the uniqueness of the concept of
land ownership in Russia.1' To prescribe the same economic
and legal formula for all different countries would be to ig-
nore other historical, legal, and economic forms of privatiza-
tion."' The experience of privatization in the West and the
lessons learned are not tremendously meaningful to Russia
because her own development has been unlike other countries
in Western Europe and other parts of the world."17 However,
one cannot forget that Russian property law and its Soviet
and Tsarist predecessors originated from the continental
European civil law tradition."' The civil law has an absolute
character of ownership concept 59 as opposed to the varying
forms of ownership under common law.'6' The civil law deals
151. See id.
152. See Baev, supra note 20, at 1.
153. See supra Part II.
154. See Baev, supra note 20, at 2.
155. See Baev, supra note 48, at 139 (arguing that the American "do as we
do" approach is not the best way to approach the issue of privatization in Rus-
sia).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Baev, supra note 20, at 15.
159. The continental European civil law provides for one object of ownership
and one right of ownership. Many of the forms of ownership in the common law
system have no direct counterparts in civil law.
160. See Baev, supra note 20, at 15 (provides a discussion of the various es-
tates in land in the common law system).
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with tangible, movable objects, but does not address abstract
intangible rights found in the common law system. 6' Such
distinctions make it difficult, if not impossible, to introduce
common law concepts of land ownership into the Russian le-
gal system. The obstacles that must be overcome include the
concept of state ownership of land, ambiguous title, and fi-
nally the limited rights to use and alienate property. 112
Russia's history demonstrates that state devolution of
land cannot occur overnight. Privatization of state-owned
property precludes collective ownership being vested with an
undivided interest in the owner.'63 Such devolution of the
concepts and rights of ownership causes confusion.6 4 Since
there is no land register, locating the owners of a specific par-
cel of land presents significant problems.'65 Moreover, title to
the land cannot be assured because only an administrative
document or state land certificate establishes the grant of the
particular parcel of land for a specified use.'66 Due to the lack
of a land register, an interested buyer would have a difficult
time trying to track prior transfers of title or encumbrances.'67
Furthermore, a person who is entitled to use the agricultural
land has no right to own it.'
Urban land is likewise considered to be an object for agri-
cultural production.'69 Unlike the common law concept of
mineral rights, Russian law does not recognize the principle
that possession of land equates to possession of everything
that is attached to or under that land.7 Although this nar-
row interpretation of land ownership is necessary to combat
potential corruption, it is nevertheless an interpretation that
conflicts with the notion of absolute land ownership.'7' How-
ever, in order for privatization to be successful in Russia, the
161. An example of this is possession in fee simple. See id.
162. See id. at 16.
163. See id.
164. See id. (discussing the problems and unique attributes of socialist-based
legal systems).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 17.
169. See id.
170. See id. See also BUTLER, supra note 46, 515-27 (providing a full discus-
sion on the development of natural resource law in Russia).
171. See Baev, supra note 20, at 17.
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initial objective must be to ensure economic stability.'72 Once
that goal is achieved, Russian property law will align more
naturally with the civil law traditions of their European
neighbors.
Despite these obstacles it is important to note two gen-
eral observations concerning privatization. 174 First, privatiza-
tion has the potential to increase "static efficiency," meaning
that privatization can push enterprises to operate in a more
cost effective manner.17  Secondly, only by privatizing prop-
erty rights can a developing country encourage foreign in-
vestment.176  Russia's current property laws are hindering
new investment because they do not allow land owners to re-
alize the land's full potential. 77 These arguments sum up the
United States' notion of privatization: "efficiency is the bot-
tom line.'7 8 For the time being, the method of abolishing old
socialist restraints on alienation remains the battleground.
19
Russian land legislation continues to evolve from "subjective
restrictions" on the alienation of land, as was the case in the
Soviet era, to the "objective restrictions" on the types of land
that may be privatized.80
Do the two points raised above suggest that public as op-
posed to private ownership is the key element that deter-
mines economic success or failure?' Some experts argue that
there is no difference in economic performance under public
or private ownership.' 2 This argument leads to the conclu-
sion that the causes of inefficiency in the public sector are not
so much "the differences in the transferability of ownership
172. See Baev, supra note 48, at 137-38.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 139 (discussing the views of Mary M. Shirley, a leading expert
and the Chief of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development
Division of the World Bank).
175. See id. at 140.
176. See id.
177. Those in favor of the unrestricted alienation of farmland argue that
merely allowing leasehold estates does not create investors with a clear interest
in putting their own funds at risk. See id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Baev, supra note 20, at 20.
181. See Baev, supra note 48, at 140.
182. See id. at 140-41 (citing a 1982 survey from Borcherding, Pommerehne
& Schneider, a 1983 survey from Millward & Parker, and finally a 1986 survey
from C.W. Boyd).
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but rather [are due to a] lack of competition."8 '
Privatization is not a quick fix to a complex problem.
Rather, it is a gradual process of economic transformation
and decentralization.' To isolate this process from economic,
social and political change would create economic chaos and
political instability, similar to the events transpiring after the
"mis-privatization" of industry in Russia.'85 This process de-
pends on the rule of law and strong democratic principles.
Thus it is necessary to consider the historical and economic
interests of the various political and social groups in Russia.'86
The underlying objectives of privatization are to restruc-
ture the system of state land ownership and encourage for-
eign investment.'87 Russia cannot achieve economic stability
without redefining what it means to own land and who is en-
titled to do so.'88
Another objective of land privatization is to encourage
the development of efficient farming methods through diversi-
fication of agricultural land ownership.'89 Although the pres-
ent system of collective farms is inefficient, it does not neces-
sarily need to be abolished. 9 ' Indeed, some peasants may
choose to keep their shares of land in cooperatives partly due
to their traditional view of land ownership and also due to the
success of the collectives and the decreased risk.' Simply
stated, they do not know of any other way to farm and a sud-
den drastic change in the system would create chaos.
One of the main obstacles to land reform is the individual
reluctance of the Russian people to embrace significant
change in the way they view land ownership." 2 State decrees
cannot eliminate this psychological resistance to private land
ownership.8 3 Opinion polls indicate that one-half of all farm-
ers in Russia oppose de-collectivization.' This is due to the
183. Id. at 140.
184. See id. at 144.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Baev, supra note 20, at 27 (discussing overall government objectives
in privatization and several factors that affect its course).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
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fact that the elimination of mandatory grain deliveries have
paved the way for collective farms to successfully compete
with the private sector.9 Russian agriculture has once again
established a solid footing with farms generating close to 15
billion rubles (approximately $521 million US dollars) worth
of profit in 2000.296 This increased competitive edge casts fur-
ther doubt on the notion that the collectives will liquidate in
the near future."' Still those who wish to operate independ-
ent farms should be encouraged to do so.
Freedom of land management would encourage develop-
ment of the agricultural market and give peasants an incen-
tive to use their land productively.9 On the other hand, the
need to implement sufficient safeguards to prevent land
speculation and corruption is also necessary to buttress the ill
effects of privatization.'99 Thus, safeguards are as important
to the element of the transformation of state farming as is
privatization to the reconstruction of the agricultural sys-
tem.20 ' The ultimate objective of privatization is to improve
the economic and social standards of the Russian people.'
The draft Land Code which proposes restricting the resale of
agricultural land transferred to private ownership for a pe-
riod of ten years will go a long way toward ensuring that the
abuses and corruption prevalent in the Russian Federation
will not affect such a vital aspect of the Russian economy.'02
Laws that do not give a land owner the power to utilize and
dispose of natural resources on or under the land will further
prevent speculation and ensure that such land will be used
for agricultural purposes.'
In light of their similar historical and economic develop-
ment, the land reform experiences of other ex-Soviet republics
serve as excellent models for comparison with the Russian
experience. In Kyrgyzstan, the people overwhelmingly ap-
proved a referendum in 1998 which provided for private own-
195. See id.
196. See The Week in Brief, INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, Jan. 10, 2001, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Interfax News Agency File.
197. See Baev, supra note 20, at 27.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 21.
203. See id.
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ership of land while placing a five-year moratorium on land
sales."4 Problems began to occur however, when the morato-
rium was lifted by the President of Kyrgyzstan in December
2000.205 The Kyrgyz parliament promptly vetoed the presi-
dent's action of lifting restrictions on selling and purchasing
land."6 Thus, the Kyrgyz parliament, like their Russian
counterpart, was more concerned with the mechanism used to
implement land reform rather than private land ownership in
and of itself.
In neighboring Kazakhstan, the situation is similar in
that their traditionally loyal parliament has refused to sup-
port private ownership of land." ' The Kazakh parliament ap-
parently believes that it should adopt measures to ensure
that the transition from public to private ownership occurs
without the problems and corruption that plagued Russia.' °8
To rush into land reform without creating a stable political
and financial foundation would invite disaster.0 9 Without a
strong legal regime in place, corruption and abuse would
flourish in land sales.21°
In the Ukraine, the privatization of land ownership was
permitted without the adoption of regulatory mechanisms."'
This revealed the type of corruption that may transpire if the
privatization of agricultural land occurs without the neces-
sary economic and social development.2 2 The "new rich" and
other mafia groups have been illegally buying up land certifi-
cates from unsuspecting peasant owners for a price of 50 to
100 times lower than the actual value."3 In fact, the number
of cases where land certificates were sold increased by 550
percent in 2000, exacerbating the problems of land specula-
204. See Feliks Kulov, Kyrgyz Opposition Leader Proposes Ways to Facilitate
Land Reform, RES PUBLICA, Dec. 5, 2000, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, BBC World Wide Monitoring (discussing land reform in the ex-Soviet re-
public of Kyrgyzstan).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See Baev, supra note 20, at 28.
211. See President to Prevent Rural Land Speculation, INTEL NEWS AGENCY,
Nov. 24, 2000, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBC World Wide Moni-
toring.
212. See id.
213. See id.
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tion."4 This type of corruption i.e. the illegal purchase of land
certificates, seriously undermines the argument that land re-
form is a means to achieve greater economic development.215
The President of the Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, realized that
the economic and social realities of privatization require re-
strictions on the sale of agricultural land.216 He has asked
parliament to institute a four-year moratorium on the sale of
land. 7 Although it can be argued that Russia is more eco-
nomically developed than any of the other ex-Soviet republics,
the creation of a civilized land market is still a necessary pre-
requisite to avoid these pitfalls. However, Russia has yet to
demonstrate that it is capable of creating such a market.
Restraints on alienation will likely aid in the desirable
distribution of wealth and eliminate transfers that threaten
the economic stability of the Russian people.218 Placing such
conditions on property interests until the economic and politi-
cal environment stabilizes will create conditions that are
more favorable for domestic and foreign investors.19 Moreo-
ver, Russia's land is estimated to have an eventual market
value of 5 trillion dollars; thus a stable market is of vital in-
terest to would-be foreign investors.2 A balanced approach
to land reform will provide a stable market for Russia's land,
encourage domestic and foreign investment, improve the
economy, and provide a tax base to help support local serv-
ices. " '
V. PROPOSAL
Several factors have contributed to the initial failures of
privatization."' The primary reasons are Russia's failure to
both establish legal incentives for foreign investors, as well as
Russia's prohibition of private ownership rights to agricul-
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. See also supra text accompanying note 148.
217. See President to Prevent Rural Land Speculation, supra note 211.
218. See Baev, supra note 20, at 31.
219. See id.
220. See Prosterman, supra note 6.
221. See id.
222. See Baev, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing the reason that privatization in
Russia has encountered serious economic, social, and political problems, is that
the Russian economy was pushed into the process of privatization prematurely).
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tural land. 23 However, the privatization and transfer of state
property to the private sector does not require Russia to im-
plement only one all-inclusive approach. 24 The privatization
of collective farms might solve the problems of production and
supply of agricultural goods, but it will not resolve all existing
problems of Russian agricultural land reform.2 The Russian
concept of absolute ownership is inconsistent with the public
policy goal of increasing farm efficiency through privatiza-
tion.226 Simply giving away agricultural land will encourage
corruption and further exacerbate a delicate issue. The huge
economic gap between the "new rich" in Russia and the aver-
age Russian citizen is a direct result of the implementation of
a privatization program without proper checks and bal-
ances.227 This disparity results from weaknesses in the law
and its administration, which is detrimental to foreign in-
vestment and economic growth.228 Inflation, the collapse of
the ruble in 1997, land speculation, and corruption are all by
products of the type of privatization that most US legal schol-
ars advocate. 9 These consequences neither serve the eco-
nomic interests of Russia nor increase the confidence of for-
eign investors.230
The question then becomes which restraints are neces-
sary to ensure that the privatization process develops in a
manner that allows for the optimum amount of economic
prosperity, while at the same time remains mindful of the
traditional concepts of land ownership?2"' Russia should
postpone making any decision regarding the unrestricted sale
of land until the country achieves economic and social stabil-
ity. In other words, Russia should wait until the issue is
"ripe." "' Eventually removing the decision-making process
from the government and placing it in the hands of ordinary
citizens is another key element to this gradual implementa-
223. See id. at 2.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 3.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 20.
232. See Kulov, supra note 204.
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tion of land reform. 3 This would reduce social tension, over-
come psychological and historical barriers, and ensure trans-
parency of the privatization process."'
To encourage stability, there must be two separate and
distinct mechanisms in place for the regulation and distribu-
tion of land: one for urban land and another for farm land.235
Since urban land is much more important to the economy, the
removal of urban land restrictions will encourage broad in-
vestments and stimulate the development of urban areas.2"6
The privatization of urban land must have fewer restrictions
than the system of allocating agricultural lands because Rus-
sia cannot afford to lose its agricultural production, which is
crucial to its economic health.237 Such a risk would allow Rus-
sia's "new rich" and foreigners to take advantage of inflation
and the ruble's weakness, and purchase farm land for a frac-
tion of what it is worth.238 The objectives of improving the
economy and encouraging foreign investment cannot be
achieved through "mis-privatization."23  Therefore, agricul-
tural land must be temporarily subjected to some restrictions
on its use and alienation.2 ° In the absence of such drastic
measures, fairness and equity of distribution cannot be
achieved.24 '
Another measure would be to temporarily restrict the use
of agricultural lands for any purpose other than farming in
order to discourage land speculation.242 A ten-year restriction
would create economic and political stability and it would also
233. See id.
234. See id. Kulov argues that decisions adopted by authorities should be
based on resolutions on specific issues concerning areas and plots of land made
in community town hall meetings and the like. Only the implementation of de-
cisions, rather than fruitless debates, will ensure improvement. See id.
235. See Baev, supra note 20, at 28.
236. See id. at 29.
237. See id. at 28.
238. See id.
239. See Kulov, supra note 204.
240. See Baev, supra note 20, at 28.
241. See id. at 29.
242. See id. For example, California's Williamson Act was enacted as a way
of preserving agricultural land by providing a voluntary ten-year restriction of
land to agricultural and open space uses in exchange for property tax benefits.
California landowners that contract with the State are rewarded with a prop-
erty tax reduction based on income stream, as opposed to the normal market
valuation of the land. See Dale Will, The Land Conservation Act At The 32 Year
Mark: Enforcement, Reform, and Innovation, 9 S.J. AGRI. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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give the Russian farmers sufficient time to appreciate the no-
tion of land ownership. 43 The State must be given the power
to seize land if it is not used for the specified agricultural
purpose; thus minimizing the problem of land speculation. 44
Furthermore maintaining restrictions on agricultural land
ensures that the land will remain with owners who value it.
2 45
The State must continue to ensure that collective and private
farmers have equal opportunities including access to credit
and financial assistance. 246 The Russian government should
follow the example of the United States and the European
Union and offer subsidies in order to protect the farming in-
dustry from being destroyed by excessive importation of for-
eign products.247 Other temporary restrictions such as defin-
ing "ownership" of property to exclude the natural resources
found under the land, would discourage land speculation
during the period of initial privatization and prevent corrup-
tion. 48
Agricultural land reform should reflect the current state
of economic and social transformation.2 9 If it is done prop-
erly, the restrictions will only be temporary:2 ° "A transitional
period requires only transitional law."251 The law must there-
fore continue to freely allow the sale of personal plots of land
as the initial step in a long process.22 The designation of land
as a commodity and as an object of capital investment will
help ease the Russian population into a different notion of
land ownership that will enable them to improve their econ-
243. See Baev, supra note 20, at 29.
244. See id. at 31.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 32.
247. The Russiam Federation enacted the RSFSR Law on Land Reform and
cut subsidies to the collective farms in 1991, as discussed in Part II.C.2. In
1999, U.S. farm subsidies totaled roughly $16.6 billion U.S. dollars, with the
amount expected to increase in the coming years. By comparison, the European
Union provides roughly $50 billion U.S. dollars per year in farm subsidies. See
Editorial Writers Desk, Battle on Farm Subsidies, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at
B4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers file, Los Angeles
Times (discussing the reasons advanced by the United States and European
Union for providing farm subsidies).
248. See Baev, supra note 20, at 32.
249. See id. at 27.
250. See id.
251. Kulov, supra note 204.
252. See id.
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omy. 2" Furthermore, allowing restricted land sales of private
plots will enable existing individual farmers to obtain loans
through mortgages, to buy new equipment, and to increase
their productivity.254 Looking to the future, the Russian Fed-
eration will provide an excellent market for foreign invest-
ment if a land code providing for a balanced approach to agri-
cultural land privatization is enacted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Agricultural land reform is inherently a controversial is-
sue, which helps explain why the Russian parliament has
failed to pass a comprehensive land code. '55 The process has
generated considerable political debate and has spawned nu-
merous opinions on how best to proceed with the privatization
of agricultural land.256 Many scholars recognize that this pro-
cess is necessary in order to bring in foreign investment and
improve the economic climate.2 ' But inadequate attention to
258
the process of implementation may destroy the program.
The current economic situation, political instability, absence
of the rule of law, and corruption all demand implementation
of a clear and coherent policy.259 Only the State can control
the land allocation process and designate the subsequent use
of the land. However, privatization should be driven by pub-
lic initiatives, and citizens should have the opportunity to
contribute their ideas, rather than allowing the State to ma-
nipulate the process.2" This transition period demands flexi-
ble laws that not only guarantee an owner the ability to real-
ize his ownership interest in the property but also give society
the legal means to control transfers of land accordingly.261
The Russian civil law tradition, with its "absolute charac-
ter" of ownership, may present obstacles for foreign inves-
tors.262 But the more significant legal hurdle is the improve-
ment of the Russian economy through a change in the
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Baev, supra note 20, at 33.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 34.
262. See id. at 33.
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country's concept of land ownership.2 63 Russia would do well
to learn from the mistakes of other ex-Soviet republics and
mimic their successes.264 Privatization is, in essence, a trans-
formation of society because not only must land codes and
economic conditions change, but the people's historical idea of
ownership and attitudes toward privatization must also
change.
Ownership relations are the key to the success of privati-
zation; everything else is secondary.265 Ownership is the main
goal of socio-economic development. Only economic freedom
can provide freedom of choice and stability.266 A well-thought-
out program of land privatization with sufficient safeguards
against corruption and abuse provides equity of opportunity,
establishes conditions for entrepreneurial activity, and per-
mits competition between different forms of ownership.6 7
President Putin has made the resolution of this problem a
priority for his administration and it is hoped that his politi-
cal alliance with the Communists in the Duma will provide a
positive foundation on which to build a stable program of effi-
cient but cautious land reform.
263. See id.
264. See Baev, supra note 48, at 189.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
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